Media studies as a field has traditionally been wary of the question of technology. Discussion of technology has often been constrained by concerns about technological determinism. In recent times there has been renewed interest, however, in the technological dimension of media. In part this is doubtless due to rapid changes in media technology, such as the rise of the internet and the digital convergence of media technologies. But there are also an increasing number of writers who seem to believe that media theory, and more widely social science and the humanities, needs to rethink the question of technology and its relationship to society, culture and cultural production. In some ways this move might reinvigorate debate about the ways in which technology has been understood in the humanities. Andrew Feenberg has characterized the two most dominant positions as, on the one hand, the social constructivist or 'technology studies' approach to technology, and, on the other, the 'substantivist' theory of technology.
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The first of these, the social constructivist approach, aims to show how the development of technology is shaped not by technical and scientific progress but by contingent social, cultural and economic forces. A well known example of this is given in Pinch and Bijker's discussion of the evolution of the bicycle. Pinch and Bijker resist the idea that the early evolution of the bicycle represented a linear progression driven by technological innovation. From the perspective of a linear progression it seems as if the 'safety bicycle', that is, the form of the bicycle which we are most familiar is the natural and inevitable outcome of technological progress. Instead Pinch and Bijker argue for a 'multi-directional model', where competing social factors shaped technological evolution. 2 They argue that, far from being driven by developing technology, in fact the competing needs of different social groups led to the outcome in which the safety bicycle prevailed. An especially important factor was the popularity of cycling among women -the safety bicycle was much easier to mount for a woman wearing a long dress. Although not explicitly 'constructivist', a similar argument can be found in Raymond Williams's well known discussion of television. Williams urges caution about the claims made for the transformative power of communications systems such as to be found in the 'apparently sophisticated technological determinism' of Marshall McLuhan.
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He argues that television technology, for which all the essential building blocks were in place by the end of the nineteenth century, did not really take off until some time later in response to the imperatives of what Williams calls 'mobile privatisation', that is, 'on the one hand mobility, on the other hand the more apparently self-sufficient family home '. 4 Television is a response to a particular social need arising from industrialised and urbanised societies and the shift from public to private domestic space.
It is especially a characteristic of the communication systems that all were foreseen -not in a utopian but in technical ways -before the crucial components of the developed systems had been discovered and refined. In no way is this a history of communications systems creating a new society or new social conditions. The decisive and earlier transformation of industrial production, and its new social forms … created new needs but also new possibilities, and the communications systems, down to television were their intrinsic outcome.
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Television therefore needs to be understood in the context of ongoing social changes and not in terms of the inherent or formal qualities of the medium. approach, then, is that it shows the rootedness of the technical in social processes. Human culture is the product of technics as the prosthetic relationship between the human and its 'exteriorisation' in matter. Technics therefore does not have the instrumental sense of technology as a tool that the human makes use of but rather defines the human as no longer simply a biological being. Stiegler therefore also refers to what he calls 'epiphylogenesis', that is a type of human evolution that is no longer thought of in merely biological terms (phylogenesis) but is essentially to be found in the development of the human's technical supports or 'organised inorganic matter'.
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As he puts it: 'The evolution of the "prosthesis", not itself living, by which the human is nonetheless defined as a living being, constitutes the reality of the human's evolution, as if, with it, the history of life were to continue by means other than life'. I do not consider myself as a "philosopher of technics", but rather as a philosopher who tries to contribute, along with some others, to establishing that the philosophical question is, and is throughout, the endurance of a condition which I call techno-logical: at the same time technics and logic, from the beginning forged on the cross which language and the tool form, that is, which allow the human its exteriorization. The sources of radical contingency do not reside in the subject or the predicates of consciousness, nor in any body as such. Rather, they stem from the limits of thinkability of bodies, from the ways in which they have no possible outline or form. The a-signifying status of matter … can then be understood as a residue of historically interwoven Stiegler also calls mnemotechnics 'tertiary memory', a term that he derives from Husserl's discussion of memory.
Husserl distinguishes between primary retention or memory and secondary retention or memory.
Primary retention is the kind of memory that is necessary to perceive a temporal object such as a melody: in effect the melody will not exist as an object of perception unless the listener retains or remembers the notes that precede the one that is currently heard.
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Secondary retention is, as it were, the more traditional understanding of memory where, for example, I remember a melody I heard last week. There is also a third kind of memory, which Husserl calls 'image consciousness' and Stiegler calls 'tertiary memory' where an external object, such as a picture or photograph, reactivates a memory. Now for Husserl primary memory can be rigorously distinguished from secondary or tertiary memory because it belongs to the act of perception itself, whereas secondary or tertiary memory involve acts of imaginative selection.
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Secondary and tertiary memory are thus derivative from primary memory. For Stiegler, however, something like the reverse is true: tertiary memory, the exteriorization of memory into technical objects-mnemotechnics-is constitutive of primary memory, 23 Ibid., p59.
secondary memory or our perception of the temporal object. You only have to listen twice to the same melody to see that between the two auditions, consciousness (the ear, here) never hears the same thing: something has occurred. Each new audition affords a new phenomenon, richer if the music is good, less so if not, and that is why the music lover is an aficionado of repeated auditions-a variation of selections … From one audition to the next the ear is not the same, precisely because the ear of the second audition has been affected by the first.
In other words, the perception of the temporal object (primary memory) is affected here by the imaginative selections constituted through secondary and tertiary memory.
Loss of individuation and symbolic misery
Simondon had shown that the appearance of the machine tool had caused what he called a loss of individuation for the worker, deprived of his knowledge and reduced to the condition of a pure servant of the machine which, having exteriorised this knowledge, had itself become the technical individual in place of the worker. In fact, in this sense, Simondon was reinterpreting analyses in Marx's manuscripts. With analogue technologies of the temporal object, a new loss of individuation is produced: one which tends to deprived consciousnesses of their diachronicity, that is, of their singularity. Here Stiegler refers to Gilbert Simondon, the French thinker of technology, a key influence on his work (as indeed on that of Deleuze). 30 The concept of individuation is central to Simondon's work and is at the heart of Stiegler's own understanding of technics and technicity. Simondon stresses the need, 'to understand the individual from the perspective of the process of individuation rather than the process of individuation by means of the individual'. 31 The process of individuation is thus primordial and Simondon urges us to see the individual not as a substantial or hylemorphic entity but rather as a 'metastable' equilibrium within this process or ontogenesis. In Du mode d'existence des objets techniques (On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects), Simondon argues that the rise of the machine tool removes the ability of the skilled worker to differentiate their labor from that of other workers: a 'a loss of individuation' which Stiegler sees reproduced at the level of consciousness by the new teletechnologies and their industrialisation of memory. He adds to Simondon's analysis the idea that the process of industrialisation is also a grammatisation, that is to say a process, analogous to that of the development of writing, by which idiomatic actions (for example, those of the weaver) are standardised, discretised and materialised (for example, in the Jacquard loom). 32 As he puts it, '[t]he current loss of individuation is a stage of grammatisation where three individuations, psychic, collective and techno-machinic, generalise the formalisation by calculation'. 33 However he also makes a break with Simondon, arguing that the latter failed to connect his twin theses about technical individuation, on the one hand, and psychic or collective individuation on the other. 34 vidual that is essentially constituted through organised, inorganic objects or technics. There is an important problem with Stiegler's argument here, an argument which tends to make it seem as if the possibility of recontextualisation is simply constituted by the orthographic mark. But in fact such a possibility is equally and irreducibly tied to the possibility of a new context, i.e., spatial and temporal alterity. Moreover the orthographic mark can never simply be constitutive of the relationship to (e.g., temporal) alterity because it is constituted itself as the mark that it is through its relationship with alterity. This is essentially an argument around iteration that fixed, mechanically and programmatically iterable, its meaning is never fixed. The who discovers their textuality in confronting the orthographic deferring and differing of identity (or literal synthesis) because, in losing the identity of the same text when they read and repeat it in different contexts, it is their own identity that is placed in crisis …At the moment when they discover that the same text varies and derives indefinitely in the dissemination that is all contextualisation, the reader is caught in a process of irreducible différance to the extent that the here and the now, space and time, are irreducible, to the extent also that they discover themselves to be textual, themselves to be tissued by past statements [énoncés], already-there, their own, those that they have themselves lived, as well as those which they have inherited and which must be unceasingly interpreted.
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In effect, the reader is constituted as the indefinite possibility of recontextualization. The 'program' of exact orthographic inscription does not determine the 'who' but rather frees it to experience itself as the indeterminacy of recontextualization and the irreducibility of context.
39
However, the new industrial temporal objects of analogue and digital recording represent a new relationship between singularity, consciousness and time:
The society of industrial temporal objects thus transforms our existences into a prefabricated series of clichés that we string together without perceiving very much. The coincidence of the time of the industrial temporal objects' flow with our consciousnesses has the consequence that, in making them our objects of consciousness, that is, of attention, we embrace and adopt their time: we adhere to them in such great intimacy that they come to substitute themselves for the proper temporalities of our consciousnesses. Such is the catastrophic utilization, by cultural industries, of the power of temporal objects, which results in a ecological catastrophe in the milieu of spirit that is epiphylogenesis. 40 The passivity which is ascribed here to the relationship with industrial temporal objects is inevitably reminiscent of Frankfurt School approaches to mass media. Indeed Stiegler's whole approach to understanding media as industrialization clearly recalls Adorno and Horkheimer's discussion of'culture industry' (Kulturindustrie), a connection which is explicitly discussed in La désorientation. 41 In general, media theory since the Frankfurt School has been keen to resist the pessimism of its view of mass media and, in particular, to demonstrate the active (rather than passive) role that the audience play in the construction of media meaning. 42 There has been a shift from the study of the conditions of production (industrial or otherwise) of mass media to the study of the conditions of media consumption, which is particularly evident in audience studies.
Despite the distance that he puts between his own position and the work of Adorno ( Although, in various ways, media studies has complicated earlier mass media models (most importantly through studying the diversity of audience interpretations), it is its original relation to centralized mass media that continues to shape its dominant interpretative frameworks and research priorities [...] A research agenda focused almost exclusively on the production, circulation and reception of mainstream media risks forfeiting media studies' critical edge. Its underlying assumptions miss critical dimensions of media change.
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If media studies has tended to bracket issues around the industrialised nature of media production in favor of studying the consumption of media and the 'diversity of media interpretations', that focus on consumption becomes harder to justify when the conditions of media production are changing so rapidly. Similarly if the object of media studies is shifting away from the exclusive study of what Couldry calls 'centralized mass media' then one consequence may well be a renewed need to decenter mass media, that is, to understand their historical and technological specificity. It is exactly these questions that, as we have seen, Stiegler's work opens up. More widely, it allows us to think about the technological changes associated, for example, with the rise of networks without committing us to technological determinism. As has been argued, the technical object here is also a source of contingency (or accidentality) not a threat to it. Stiegler's aporetic understanding of the relationship between technology and society fundamentally means neither term is privileged, nor is the former dissolved in the latter. 
